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It is a truism that where one starts from and the direction one goes determines where one ends up. 
This is no less true in philosophy than elsewhere, and 
certainly no less true in matters dealing with the re-
lationship between God’s foreknowledge and human 
free actions.  In what follows I will argue that the in-
compatibilist view that Fischer and others stalwartly 
defend results from the particular starting point they 
choose, and that if one adopts a different starting 
point about divine knowledge the logical incompat-
ibility they envision and philosophically anguish over 
evaporates.  I will also argue that the path Fischer and 
others tread has critical ambiguities that lead to con-
clusions that can be avoided if one clarifies the critical 
ambiguities.  The result will be that choosing a prop-
er starting point and clarifying the ambiguities will 
show that God’s foreknowledge is compatible with 
human freedom.
Fischer’s Incompatibilist Argument
We begin with Fischer’s version of the conditional 
argument for incompatibility between God’s knowl-
edge and human freedom.
1. God exists and is essentially omniscient.
Omniscience might be characterized in two ways. 
One is that God knows all the facts that can be known 
(where facts are states of affairs that were, are, or will 
be the case).  This is a claim about what God knows, 
not how he knows it.  The other is that God knows 
all true propositions that can be known, leaving open 
how God knows them.  Since facts can be expressed 
by tensed propositions, for our purposes we will treat 
for the time being the two as equivalent, though the 
significance of this distinction is important, for some 
deny that propositional formulation of knowledge is 
appropriate to God.1
2. Jones does X at T2. 
This is assumed to be a fact about the world.
3. Therefore, God believed at T1 that Jones would 
do X at T2.
This obviously assumes that God, at least in relation 
to the creation, has temporal features, and we will 
proceed as if this is the case.
Although theists advance divine foreknowledge in 
terms of knowledge, Fischer, in the company of other 
incompatibilists, uses “believe” in place of “know.”  We 
will argue that if we grant that God can have beliefs, 
only if all his beliefs come as components of his indu-
bitable and complete knowledge can we properly use 
the term “believe.”  As we will see later, denial of the 
contention that God’s states of knowing and states of 
believing are identical roots Fischer’s incompatibilist 
argument.
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There are, Fischer suggests, three possibilities about 
the past that derive from these propositions.
4. If Jones were to refrain from doing X at T2, then 
God would have held a false belief at T1, or
5. If Jones were to refrain from doing X at T2, then 
God would not have existed at T2, or
6. If Jones were to refrain from doing X at T2, then 
God would have held a different belief from the 
one He actually held at T1. (Fischer, 5; hereafter 
all in-text citations are from Fischer, Our Fate2)
Fischer goes on to reject 4, 5, and 6.  He rightly re-
jects 4 because God as omniscient cannot hold a false 
belief.  He rightly rejects 5 because God’s existence 
cannot depend on human choices or decisions, or in-
deed, on anything contingent.  But what about the 
counterfactual expressed in 6; why reject that?  He 
rejects 6 because, in conjunction with 
(FP) (Fixity of the Past):  For any action Y, agent S, 
        and  time T, if it is true that if S were to do Y at 
       T, some fact about the past relative to T would 
              not have been a fact, then S cannot at (or just prior 
        to) T do Y at T. (5)
Proposition 6, he contends, leads to 
7. Jones cannot do Y at T2,
that is, to the conclusion that humans are not free to 
do otherwise than they do.  According to FP, “not only 
cannot one causally affect the past, but also that one 
cannot so act that the past would have been different 
from what it actually was” (60).
To determine whether FP is true we need to under-
stand what Fischer means by “some fact about the 
past…would not have been a fact.”  I take it that what 
he means is that something in the past was a fact and 
now is not a fact.  That is, there was a fact X prior to 
T but no longer (after T) is X a fact.  For both Fis-
cher and the compatibilist this is unacceptable, since a 
(hard) fact is what it is and cannot later fail to obtain. 
There is no back-tracking on hard facts (103–6).3  If 
this is what he means, FP is true, for if doing Y entails 
a contradiction, S cannot do Y. 
But FP, so understood, together with 6 does not yield 
7.  Proposition 6 is a counterfactual that says that if 
Jones refrains from doing X and instead does Y, God 
would have held a belief different from what he held, 
namely, that Jones does X.  That is, if Jones does Y, 
God would have believed that Jones does Y, not that 
he does X.  Compatibilists do not hold in the case 
of divine foreknowledge of human free actions that S 
being able to do Y requires some fact not to be a fact. 
That is, compatibilists do not hold that God had a 
belief at one time and then later believed its negation. 
In short, understood in the above way, FP may be true 
but is irrelevant to the compatibilist’s understanding 
of divine foreknowledge.  The reason is that the ante-
cedent in FP as applied to God’s knowledge is false. 
Consequently, it along with 6 simply does not lead to 7. 
To make this clear, consider a re-write of 6, identify-
ing a fact about the past.
8. If Jones were to refrain from doing X at T2, then 
God would have believed at T1 that Jones does not 
do X at T2.
If Jones does Y instead of X, then God would have be-
lieved that Jones does Y and not X.  There would not 
have been a prior fact that God believed that Jones 
does X because Jones in fact does Y, not X.  Proposition 
3 would never have been true.  Because one cannot al-
ter the past, God’s belief about Jones does not change; 
it is just that whatever Jones does, God believes.  But 
then there is no incompatibility between God’s belief 
about Jones and Jones’s freedom either to do X or not 
to do X.  Proposition 8, as a counterfactual, is perfectly 
compatible with 3 and with Jones’s freedom to do Y. 
What God believes depends on what Jones does.  If 
Jones does X, God always believes that.  Could Jones 
do Y?  Yes, because in case Jones does Y, God believes 
that and not 3.  What follows from 6 and 8 is not that 
Jones cannot do other than X at T2  but rather that 
Jones does not do other than X at T2.4
Possible-worlds Formulation of Incompatibi-
lism
Fischer holds that even if the incompatibilist’s ar-
gument based on FP fails, other versions proceed 
unscathed.  Hence, he goes on to present a possi-
ble-worlds formulation of the argument, in the pro-
cess revising FP in possible-worlds terminology.
(FP*) An agent X has it in his power at (or just prior 
          to) T in possible world w to do X only if there 
           is a possible world w* with the same past as that 
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         of w up to T in which S does X at T.  (11, 111).
Given 1-3 above,
9. That God believes at T1 that Jones will do X en-
tails that Jones does X at T2.  (From God’s essen-
tial omniscience)
10. In all possible worlds in which God believes at T1 
that Jones would do X at T2, Jones does X at T2. 
(from possible-worlds definition of entailment)
11. Therefore, in any possible world in which Jones 
does not do X at T2, God does not believe at T1 
that Jones will do X at T2.
12. Therefore, Jones does not have it in his power at 
or just prior to T2 to refrain from doing X at T2. 
(From 11 and FP*)
Unfortunately, 12 does not follow from 11 and FP*. 
What God knows (and hence believes) depends (in 
an epistemological sense relating to the ground for the 
belief ) upon what Jones does.  If Jones does X, then 
God has always known that Jones would do X, and if 
Jones does Y, God always knows that as well.  Which-
ever Jones does determines the part of w and w* up to 
T2 that concerns God’s belief about what Jones does. 
Hence, 9 is trivially true, for what God believes or 
knows about what Jones does at T2 depends epistem-
ically for its truth-grounding entirely on what Jones 
does at T2, and hence is entailed by what God believes 
and God’s omniscience.  Further, 11 does not entail 
that Jones could not have done otherwise, only that 
Jones does not do otherwise and God does not believe 
that he does otherwise.
The dispute comes down to this.  The incompatibilist 
and compatibilist both agree that there is no possible 
world in which God knows Jones does X (or believes, 
taking “believe” and “know” as equivalent in God’s 
case) and Jones does Y.  The incompatibilist takes this 
to mean that if God knows Jones does X, then Jones 
cannot do Y.  God’s knowledge or belief is a fact about 
the past and cannot change.  But for Jones to be able 
to do Y, God’s knowledge must be able to change. 
The compatibilist takes it to mean that if Jones does Y, 
there is no possible world in which Jones does Y and 
in which God believes (knows) that Jones does X.  If 
Jones does Y, then God (always) believes that Jones 
does Y.  The same, of course, goes for Jones doing X. 
In other words, they agree that, since God’s knowl-
edge is infallible, what God believes must match what 
Jones does.  The compatibilist takes from this that no 
possible world exists in which Jones does something 
that God does not believe.  It is not that if Jones does 
Y rather than X, God’s belief must change or be dif-
ferent from what it was; it never was or could be the 
case that he believed Jones does X in such a case.  It 
is Jones doing it that determines what God believes. 
Thus, counterfactually, Jones could always have done 
other than he did.  Jones’s freedom is preserved; what 
God believes depends on what Jones does.
From his discussion, it seems that Fischer will reply 
that we have substituted “know” for “believe,” and 
these are two different mental states, both for us and 
for God.  And this will get us to our radically different 
starting points.  We will argue that, unlike us, “God 
can have beliefs only as components of knowledge.”5 
To Fischer’s discussion of how God knows we now 
turn.
God’s as an Evidentialist
As I noted at the outset, the position one ends up 
with depends both upon where one starts and the 
decisions one makes along the way.  Fischer begins 
with an account of human knowledge.  “When a 
human being who believes that p is in a knowledge 
conferring situation (KCS) with respect to p, and p 
turns out to be true, she thereby has knowledge that 
p” (36).  Since for Fischer knowledge is unified in that 
all individuals—human, divine, and otherwise—who 
find themselves in a KCS where they believe p and 
p turns out to be true have knowledge, this account 
applies to God as well.  This, as it stands seems un-
controversial, though perhaps trivial.  Each type of 
individual that can have beliefs could be said to know 
p provided it is in a KCS with respect to p, believes p, 
and p is true.  The critical ambiguity in this account 
is whether these diverse types of individuals must be 
in the same KCS, or whether the KCS can vary, even 
very considerably, among and according to the types 
of individuals.  I find Fischer is unclear about this, 
but I think that he wants all the types of individu-
als to have the same KCS.  I say this because in his 
incompatibilist argument he moves from features of 
the human KCS to attributing the same features to 
the divine KCS.  Indeed, this contention is absolutely 
critical to his incompatibilist’s case, which is modeled 
on human believing.6  Each of his discussions starts 
with the human KCS and from there moves to the 
analogous divine KCS.  As he says, “we do wish to 
avoid ascribing mysterious and baffling properties and 
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powers to God” (142–43).
Fischer does not commit specifically to what either 
the human or the divine KCS is; indeed, even in the 
human case, as Fischer points out, philosophers wide-
ly disagree about the specifics of the KCS.  One would 
expect the same for those describing God’s KCS. 
However, Fischer does make two important claims 
about the human and, in parallel, the divine KCS: 
they are both evidential and representational.  Fischer 
addresses the first by claiming that God, like human 
beings, must believe based on sufficient evidence, “ev-
idence that entails the truth of the believed proposi-
tion” (37).  Knowing p based on evidence that entails 
p is what gives God certainty (and hence the knowl-
edge that he is in a KCS).7  God is the evidentialist 
par excellence.  At the same time, God possesses an 
additional advantage over us in terms of self-under-
standing; God knows that he is omniscient.  Hence, 
God knows that if he believes p and is in a KCS that 
has sufficient evidence, p is true, and he knows p with 
certainty.  
Yet not all of our knowledge is acquired by evidential 
inferencing.  Some of our knowledge, such as percep-
tual knowledge, is immediate or intuitive, not infer-
ential.  I know that there is something (a flicker in 
my maple tree) because I see it outside my window. 
That what I see is a flicker and not a chickadee and a 
maple tree and not an oak may be inferential, but I do 
not make an inference to the existence of something 
perceived in a location but have direct or immediate 
experience of it.  We might term this a basic act of 
knowing.  As William Alston writes, 
We might be able to distinguish, within a par-
ticular complex of perceptual experience, an as-
pect of sheer givenness or sheer awareness of 
something, from the conceptual or judgemental 
activity of taking this given as such and such.  It 
might further be speculated that in early stages 
of individual psychological development, and in 
relatively unorganized psychological conditions 
of adult subjects (just falling off to sleep or just 
waking up, for example) we have the bare aware-
ness element without the conceptual structuring.  
Considerations like this may give us some sense 
of what a purely non-propositional knowledge 
would be like.  God can surely grasp any con-
crete whole fully, not just partial aspects thereof. 
And God has no need to extend His knowledge, 
inferentially or otherwise, since it is necessarily 
complete anyway.8  
Alston sees God’s knowledge not as proposition-
al but as intuitive, which “represents the fullest and 
most perfect realization of the cognitive ideal,… for 
the fact known is ‘bodily present’ in the knowledge.”9 
But even if it can be expressed propositionally, it most 
likely is intuitive and immediate rather than inferen-
tial and evidential.
But suppose it is true that God must rely on sufficient 
evidence to know, what would be sufficient evidence 
for God such that the evidence (along with God’s 
self-knowledge of essential omniscience) entails that 
the future p is true?  Surely, a large part of the evidence 
concerning future events would itself be future in na-
ture, so that God’s knowledge would consist of strings 
of entailments leading from the present to the future. 
But would these entailments hold in a causally inde-
terministic world or a world with free agency?  To use 
Fischer’s example, in a world of indeterministic free 
choice, Jones on Wednesday freely decides wheth-
er he will mow his lawn.  In worlds w (where Jones 
mows) and w* (where Jones does not mow) that have 
the same events up to the moment of Jones’s choice, 
even knowing Jones’s character and the state of the 
weather at T1, how would this information entail what 
choice Jones is going to make on Wednesday, or in-
deed, the Wednesday of a year or five years from now? 
Given all Jones’s possible intermediate choices, how 
can God know with certainty on Monday, as Fischer 
claims, that Jones will mow on Wednesday or the fol-
lowing Wednesdays? Would not the world have to be 
deterministic for these multitudes of extensive strings 
of entailments to hold with certainty?  Coupling the 
inferential requirement with extensive human inde-
terminism effectively guts divine foreknowledge of 
human actions.  Although Fischer contends his view 
allows God to have more knowledge than the open 
theists claim, I fail to see a significant difference on 
this evidentialist account, and both are problematic 
for the traditional theist.10
In short, the reason the incompatibilist problem aris-
es, I suggest, is that Fischer attempts to accommodate 
God’s foreknowledge to our own KCS, which does 
not allow for such knowledge.  Thus, he talks about 
fallible inference regarding the future, backward 
causation, bootstrapping, and the like, to overcome 
the gap.  But the difference is plain and simple:  by 
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having foreknowledge, God’s KCS includes a way of 
knowing (and believing) not accessible to us.  If one 
is to ascribe foreknowledge to God, one has to allow 
that God may have epistemic powers that are unavail-
able to us.
God’s Beliefs and Hard and Soft Facts
God has foreknowledge, infallible and certain, a kind 
of knowledge that we do not have.  Why then suppose 
that our way of knowing (KCS), which does not in-
clude foreknowledge, is totally (or even partially) anal-
ogous to the way God knows?  Fischer develops his 
defense when he chooses to discuss the issue of com-
patibilism and incompatiblism in terms of hard and 
soft facts, the very defining of which has generated its 
own cottage industry.11  He notes that Pike chooses to 
work with these terms in a pre-analytic sense.  A hard 
fact is one that is “‘fully accomplished and over and 
done with’ at the relevant time” (131); there is noth-
ing more that can be done to make the proposition 
about the fact true or false.  He terms this “resistance.” 
Soft facts, on the other hand, are not over and done 
with; the truth or falsity of the relevant propositions 
remains to be determined after T (120-21).12  
At the heart of Fischer’s argument are three claims 
about the human KCS.  (1) There are soft facts that 
have a hard-core component, that is, a part that is a 
hard fact or property.  For example, although the over-
all fact of acting or occurring before something else 
happens in the future (e.g., giving a speech ten years 
before a Syrian peace treaty is signed; my alarm clock 
ringing a half hour before I actually got up) is a soft 
fact—since the entire state of affairs expressed by the 
proposition is not over and done with until later—, 
this past action or event  (giving a speech or the alarm 
ringing) is itself a state that is fixed in the past, regard-
less of what happens in the future.  (2) For humans, 
knowing differs from believing in that being in the 
state of mind of knowing depends on whether what 
one knows actually occurs (knowing a “future propo-
sition exhibits a kind of counterfactual dependent on the 
future” (138)), whereas one can be in the state of mind 
of believing regardless of whether what one believes 
occurs.  (3) God’s believing about the future is a soft 
fact with a hard-core component.  It is, in this sense, 
a hybrid.  Like human believing, since it has the fixity 
of the past, it has the hard-core fact that God is in 
the state of believing.  Unlike human believing, it is a 
soft fact since God having the belief is counterfactu-
ally dependent upon the future.  In Fischer’s language, 
God’s belief is resilient to the future.  “God’s prior 
beliefs are either hard-core or hard-type facts.  In ei-
ther case, … they cannot be falsified without affecting 
some genuine feature of the past” (146). 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that (1) and (2) are 
true with respect to human knowing.  The problem 
again arises with the interpretation of (3).  If God has 
beliefs, his beliefs are identical with his knowledge. 
There is nothing that God believes that he does not 
know to be true with certainty, and there is nothing 
he does not know with certainty that he does not be-
lieve.  And what God knows counterfactually depends 
upon the future, such that if that future event does not 
occur God does not know (and hence believe) that 
future event.  If, as Fischer concedes (138), knowledge 
of the future is counterfactually dependent upon the 
future and hence consists of soft facts, the same would 
apply to God’s beliefs.  God would not believe it if it 
did not occur.  Hence, like knowledge, the truth of the 
belief and God’s very having of it depends counter-
factually upon the future.  Thus, a critical difference 
between God’s beliefs and ours exists:  Our beliefs are 
not identical to our knowledge, and hence the fact of 
our holding them does not counterfactually depend 
on the future but is a hard fact, but God’s beliefs are 
so dependent and hence are soft facts.  Hence, like 
knowledge, God’s beliefs can be counterfactually fal-
sified, but if so, the hard part of the fact —that God’s 
believed x—would not change but would have been 
different from the beginning—God would not have 
believed x.  They can be counterfactually “falsified 
without affecting some genuine feature of the past” 
(146).  
Foreknowledge and Mental Representations 
Fischer advances his case for using the human ana-
logue of belief to understand divine belief by invoking 
a theory of mental representations, such that “God’s 
belief states somehow involve mental representations, 
and that in a very broad sense these representations 
have formal properties” (139–40), and since they in-
volve representing the world, they must be the same 
as or analogous to human mental states of the same 
representation.  For Fischer, satisfying these formality 
conditions is necessary for the incompatibilist argu-
ment to succeed.  Yet, how this representation would 
work with God Fischer cannot say.  Since it cannot be 
physically instantiated, how close the analogy would 
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be is difficult to characterize.  But still, he affirms, it 
must be so.
But why think that God’s knowledge or beliefs are 
representational, requiring words or pictures.  Perhaps 
God’s beliefs are formed (if being “formed” is the 
right word to describe God’s “acquisition” of beliefs) 
and entertained in a radically different way.  This, 
of course, would not be unusual.  The human KCS 
lacks many of the abilities or ways of knowing that 
are found in other animal species, and vice versa.  We 
cannot know by sonar as dolphins; we do not sense 
objects like snakes with their heat sensitive organs 
or by echolocation as bats; we do not use ultraviolet 
light like houseflies and wasps, gravity like some in-
vertebrates, or magnetic fields like bees to know our 
world.  Hence, the details of the KCS of a dolphin, 
bat, or snake will differ greatly from that of humans 
and likewise, presumably of God.  More specifically, 
in their believing, these creatures might not engage in 
representation at all.  
William Hasker argues that while nonrepresentation-
al intuition might work for God to know things im-
mediately present to his awareness, “there is a require-
ment for an inner mental representation on God’s 
part, to enable him to know what has passed away or 
(perhaps) what is yet to come” (Hasker, 391).  And 
from the fact that inner mental representations are 
necessary for knowing the past and possibly the future, 
he concludes that they are also necessary for God’s 
knowledge of the present, such that God has beliefs 
that, because of Occam’s razor, must be described in 
ways that involve inferencing.  But must there be rep-
resentations for knowledge of the past (memory) or 
of the future?  Given that at least some of the animals 
mentioned above appear to have memories from the 
way their past experiences bear upon and shape their 
behavior, still we have no evidence that their believing 
or even knowing is representational.  Again, William 
Alston, 
A creature in our condition needs inner rep-
resentations in order to be able to think about 
absent states of affairs, since the facts are rarely 
if ever directly present to our consciousness.  But 
since God enjoys the highest form of knowledge 
He is never in that position, and so He has no 
need for inner representations that he can “car-
ry around with Him” for use when the facts are 
absent.13
But, Hasker asks, how can God know something 
without representations and noninferentially that 
has not yet occurred?  We reply that if God has fore-
knowledge, it may be the case that God has this via 
a kind of immediate experience of the future event. 
If so, his knowing operates in ways both similar and 
different from ours.  It is like our basic perceptual ex-
perience in that it is immediate; it is unlike it in that 
God can perceive things in the future in ways that we 
cannot.  As Alston puts it, for God knowledge has a 
“trans-temporal character.”14 
 
But still, one might object, the compatibilist has not 
specified exactly how God knows future events when 
they have not yet occurred.  For the incompatibilist, 
God’s knowledge or belief about the future is in the 
past, so that it is not an open issue whether Jones does 
X and whether God knows or believes X.  God cannot 
“wait” until Jones does it to have knowledge of it.  For 
the compatibilist, God’s foreknowledge of the future 
has two parts:  fore and knowledge.  It brings togeth-
er two dimensions that we find difficult to reconcile 
from a human epistemic perspective.  The “fore” refers 
to the time dimension, such that before the event oc-
curs God knows what will occur.  The state of God’s 
“mind” before the event is one of knowing the event, 
indeed, all events, past, present, and future.  It is not as 
if God “waits” until the event occurs to know what it 
is; he knows it (the event) beforehand.  In this sense, 
God’s knowledge is, as Alston terms it, trans-tem-
poral, in that God can know at all times what Jones 
does.  The “knowledge” refers to what God knows and 
its epistemic ground.  God knows the event on the 
ground of its happening.  Because (in an epistemic, not 
causal sense) it happens, God knows it.  In this sense, 
God’s state of mind is “open,” not in a temporal sense, 
but in that what God believes or knows depends on 
what happens.  Here the knowing closely resembles 
our immediate, non-inferential perceptual experience. 
If we treat God’s mental state, either as a whole or in 
part, as intuitive rather inferential, it differs from our 
immediate experience in that it has a trans-temporal 
character.  It is knowing in that God is in a knowledge 
conferring state (here, immediate intuition), believes 
that the event occurs, the event occurs, and God as 
omniscient is certain of it.  This description provides 
some understanding of divine knowing, using catego-
ries derived from human epistemic experience.  That I 
cannot fully explain God’s knowing the future leaves 
it somewhat a mystery, and as we have seen Fischer 
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eschews mysteries in epistemology.  But granting 
God the ability to foreknow requires that we go be-
yond analogues that lack this ability, and appealing to 
intuitive knowledge helps explain the general struc-
ture of why compatibilism works.
Does the compatibilist have to fully delineate how 
this type of trans-temporal knowledge, possessed by 
God—that God’s knows beforehand what someone 
does and yet this knowledge epistemically depends 
on what happens—is possible?  I don’t think so.15 
Indeed, I may speculate about but don’t presume to 
know how God knows the past and present either. 
The claim of divine omniscience is only that God 
knows all facts that are knowable; it does not specify 
how God achieves this.  But not fully knowing how 
God knows does not differ from the case of human 
knowing.  Although I can give some details of the 
causal sequence that results in my knowledge or belief 
that Lake Owasso has no ice on it, I cannot complete-
ly specify how (the causal mechanism) I have formed 
this belief or attained this knowledge.  I can specify 
certain features, from perceptual activity of seeing no 
ice but only water on the lake, to having certain neural 
activity.  I can even try to specify what it is to know 
something, although, as Fischer acknowledges, multi-
ple theories about what constitutes knowing abound. 
But the precise and detailed causal mechanism and 
epistemic requirements need not be available to me 
for me to make a belief or knowledge claim.  It is par-
allel to knowledge of basic acts.  I don’t know how I 
can raise my arm but I can do so if I am in a normal 
physical state.  I don’t need to be able to explain how 
I do it in order to do it.
What is evident is that the problem is no longer 
that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with hu-
man freedom.  Rather, it is whether foreknowledge 
is possible at all.  If foreknowledge is to analyzed us-
ing human models that lack this ability, if it requires 
representations, and if representations are possible 
only if what is represented has already occurred, then 
divine foreknowledge is not possible.  But the issue 
now differs from the incompatibilism that occasioned 
the discussion.  The discussion of incompatibilism 
began with the assumption that both foreknowledge 
and free choice were possible and concluded that if 
they are possible they are incompatible.  Here the is-
sue shifts to the much more difficult question of what 
foreknowledge about future contingencies would be 
like for God and what God can know.  Since we lack 
the ability to foreknow, our epistemic experience falls 
short in fully assisting us to construct the divine mod-
el.
I conclude that if God has belief states, they do not 
differ from his knowing states.  The kind of log-
ic that Fischer and other incompatibilists employ 
about knowing the future simply might not apply, for 
it is grounded on separating knowing and believing 
in God.16 If God knows p directly beforehand, then 
God can know about p in a way that p is the epistemic 
ground for his knowledge and belief.  But even with-
out this suggestion, the kind of KCS available to God 
regarding the future (and perhaps events present and 
past) will significantly differ from ours if we grant him 
genuine foreknowledge.  This being the case, there is 
no contradiction between S freely bringing about p 
and God believing or knowing that S brings about p.
Conclusion
As I noted at the outset, the position one ends up 
with depends both upon where one starts and the de-
cisions one makes along the way.  Fischer begins with 
a theory that he calls the unified theory of knowing. 
For him, all individuals, human and divine, have the 
same knowledge structure:  if they are in a knowl-
edge conferring situation (KCS) and believe p, and p 
is true, it follows that they know p.  As a very general 
description this is well and good, but Fischer goes on 
to assume that God’s KCS (and perhaps that of many 
other creatures) is the same as ours.  This starting as-
sumption is absolutely critical to the incompatibilist’s 
case.  But while God has a KCS, there is no reason 
to think that God’s KCS is the same as ours, espe-
cially with regard to his possession of a property that 
we lack, namely, foreknowledge.  Whereas the human 
KCS does not allow significant foreknowledge, even 
on a fallibilist view of knowledge, traditional Chris-
tian theism holds that God’s KCS allows perfect fore-
knowledge.  Contrary to Fischer, unlike us, God most 
likely is not an evidentialist.  On God’s KCS, God 
probably has direct and not inferential knowledge of 
future events.  God knows them intuitively, so that 
they are the ground for his knowledge and, concomi-
tantly, the truths about them.  
Further, for God there is no difference between 
knowing and believing.  What he knows he believes, 
and vice versa.  Hence, for God in contrast to us, his 
believing depends, not causally but epistemically, on 
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what happens.  Consequently, the starting point of 
the compatibilist differs significantly from that of the 
incompatibilist.  By restricting God’s KCS to being 
like ours, which lacks genuine foreknowledge, and by 
distinguishing between God’s knowledge and beliefs 
and by assimilating the latter analogically to fallible 
human believing, the incompatibilist has created the 
problem of divine omniscience and human freedom.
Second, along the way Fischer develops FP, sometimes 
accepting it, other times questioning it.  But even if it 
is true, FP is irrelevant to the issue at hand.  The com-
patibilist makes no such claim that it is possible that 
God has a belief (a hard fact) and then does not have 
it (another hard fact).  If S were to do Y rather than 
X, no fact about the past relating to God’s beliefs has 
changed.  No alleged fact (like X) would have been a 
fact, for God would have known that S did Y rather 
than X.  Hence, there is no reason why S cannot do 
Y at T.  There is no fact with which doing Y conflicts. 
FP and its cohorts fail to further the incompatibilist 
cause.17
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